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Laptops and the Border Search Exception to
the Fourth Amendment: Protecting the United
States Borders From Bombs, Drugs, and
the Pictures from Your Vacation
VICTORIA WILsoN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Department of Homeland Security asserts that Federal Cus-
toms agents have the uninhibited right to detain international travelers at
the border while they search the contents of their laptops, cell phones,
and other electronic devices without any individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing.' In 2008 the Department of Homeland Security first
released its policy, which allowed customs agents to search, copy, and
retrieve contents of a laptop computer, including confiscating the laptop
itself for a reasonable period of time without any individualized suspi-
cion.2 The policy has alarmed many travelers' and prompted the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union to file suit on August 26, 2009, seeking
records on the Customs and Border Protection's policy of searching
travelers' laptops.' The very next day, the Department of Homeland
Security released a revised policy limiting the amount of time that elec-
tronic devices can be held by customs officers. It also states that infor-
* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Miami School of Law; B.S. 2007, University of
Florida. Thank you to Professor Ricardo Bascuas for his guidance throughout the writing process.
1. See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Border Search of Electronic Devices Containing
Information, CBP Directive No. 3340-049 § 1 (August 2009).
2. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Policy Regarding Border Search of Information
(July 16, 2008), http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/travelladmissibility/search-authority.ctt/
search -authority.pdf.
3. Editorial, Laptop seizures 'truly alarning,' MARSHFIELD NEws-HERALD, Aug. 19, 2008,
at A6; Thomas Claburn, DHS Clarifies Laptop Border Searches, INFORMATIONWEEK
GOVERNMENT, Aug. 28, 2009, http://www.informationweek.com/news/govemment/security/show
Article.jhtml?articlelD=219500468.
4. Complaint at 3, 6, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 2009 WL
2627670 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2009) (No. 09 Civ. 7465). The first documents released by Customs
and Border Protection revealed that in nine months over 1,500 electronic devices were searched,
cell phones being the most common. Other devices searched include digital cameras, thumb
drives, DVDs and hard drives. American Civil Liberties Union, Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) First Production Documents (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/
customs-and-border-protection-cbp-first-production-documents.
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mation from electronic devices can now only be retained if there is
probable cause that a crime has been committed;5 however, a customs
officer may still search electronic devices and may review and analyze
the information encountered at the border without any suspicion.6 The
Department of Homeland Security claims this policy is justified because
the searches of these devices can:
help detect evidence relating to terrorism and other national security
matters, human and bulk cash smuggling, contraband, and child por-
nography. They can also reveal information about financial and com-
mercial crimes, such as those relating to copyright, trademark and
export control violations. Finally, searches at the border are often
integral to a determination of admissibility under the immigration
laws.'
The Department of Homeland Security has also stated that of the
144 million international travelers between October 1, 2008 and May 5,
2009, only 1947 were subject to searches of their electronic devices.'
Several courts have upheld the powers asserted in this policy, holding
that the search of files contained within electronic storage devices does
not require any level of suspicion at the border.' In an amicus brief filed
on behalf of the defendant-appellee in United States v. Arnold, the
American Civil Liberties Union pointed out that a single case "offers a
rare glimpse inside our border officials' systematic but unchecked policy
of randomly searching, seizing, and copying the contents of travelers'
laptop computers.""o
It may seem easier to uphold a policy where the cases before the
court concern child pornography, as most of them have, but courts
sometimes may not recognize the broader picture of the systematic intru-
sions inflicted on innocent people." Hundreds of travelers have had to
5. See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Border Search of Electronic Devices Containing
Information, CBP Directive No. 3340-049 §§ 5.3.1, 5.4.1.1 (August 2009).
6. See id.
7. Id. § 1.
8. DHS Privacy Office, Annual Report to Congress, July 2008-June 2009 54 (Sept. 2009),
httyp://www.dhs.gov/gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-rptannual_2009.pdf.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Singh, 295 F. App'x 190, 190 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Linarez-Delgado, 259 F. App'x
506, 507-08 (3d Cir. 2007); Singh v. Scott, No. CV 08-86-GF-SHE, 2009 WL 2370636, at *5 (D.
Mont. July 29, 2009). United States v. Bunty, No. 07-641, 2008 WL 2371211, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
June 10, 2008); United States v. Hampe, No. 07-3-B-W, 2007 WL 1192365, at *4 (D. Me. Apr.
18, 2007).
10. Brief for Association of Corporate Travel Executives and Electronic Frontier Foundation
as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee at 14, United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003
(2008) (No. 05-772), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/US-v_arnold/arnold_amicus.
pdf.
11. "There may be, and I am convinced that there are, many unlawful searches of . . .
innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is made, about which
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stand by and wait for sometimes hours while strangers rummage through
their emails, photos, browser history, and documents.
Although the percentage of travelers who have had their laptops
searched at the border seems small, the judicial support of this policy
means that investigative resources are currently the only thing limiting
the number of electronic devices searched at the border. In United States
v. Ickes, the court stated that "[c]ustoms agents have neither the time nor
the resources to search the contents of every computer."' 2 However,
advances in technology along with judicial approval will likely result in
the increase in searches of electronic devices as customs improve their
ability to search." Furthermore, lacking the resources to search on a
mass scale is different from having the right to search.
This comment reviews the protections provided by the Fourth
Amendment at the border and argues that the border exception to the
Fourth Amendment does not justify the suspicionless search of informa-
tion contained within computer files. Part II examines the history and the
modem application of the border exception to the Fourth Amendment.
Part III introduces the application of the border exception to electronic
storage devices. Part IV argues that the purpose of the border exception
does not support the suspicionless searches of information contained
within a laptop, and such searches only serve general law enforcement
goals; therefore, the search of laptop files falls outside the scope of a
reasonable border search. Part V argues the border exception should not
apply to a device that can only contain information. First, the govern-
ment's need to search data and information is lower and the traveler's
interest in the free flow of information weighs against that need. Second,
the treatment of correspondence contained within international mail
underscores the caution courts demonstrate when dealing with the read-
ing of correspondence, and highlights the inconsistencies between the
treatment of information in international mail and laptops at the border.
Part VI concludes, briefly explaining that the border exception should
not apply to the supicionless search of the files within a laptop.
courts do nothing, and about which we never hear." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181-
82 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
12. 393 F.3d 501, 506-07 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that the possibility that "any person
carrying a laptop computer ... on an international flight would be subject to a search of the files
on the computer 'hard drive'" was "far-fetched").
13. See Laptop Searches and Other Violations of Privacy Faced by Americans Returning
from Overseas Travel: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and
Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, I 10th Cong (2008) (statement of Lee Tien,
Senior Staff Attorney, Electronic Frontier Foundation) at 10, available at http://www.eff.org/files/
filenode/travelscreening/tien%20testimony.pdf (discussing the technological advancements that
could be used to increase customs ability to search electronic devices at the border).
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II. SEARCHES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE
BORDER EXCEPTION
There are two theories interpreting what is required by the Fourth
Amendment before a governmental search can be conducted; the "war-
rant preference"l 4 theory and the "generalized reasonableness"'" theory.
Under both of these approaches, some level of individualized suspicion
is generally required by the Fourth Amendment before the government
may conduct a search.' 6 There are a few narrowly drawn exceptions to
the requirement of individualized suspicion such as searches that serve
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement," sobriety
checkpoints, and border searches." Furthermore, whether authorized by
warrant, probable cause, or a Fourth Amendment exception, government
searches must be justified at inception and reasonably related in scope to
circumstances which justified interference in the first place.'
A. Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment
The routine border search is among the few searches that can be
made without any individualized suspicion at all. The Constitution gives
14. Under the "warrant preference" theory, the Fourth Amendment generally requires a
warrant or probable cause, see, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967), although
there are certain exceptions, including the border exceptions. See generally United States v.
Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531
(1985); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977). Probable cause exists when there is a fair
probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place, see, e.g., United States v.
Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
15. Under the "generalized reasonableness" theory, the Fourth Amendment requires searches
and seizures to be reasonable and sometimes reasonableness may require a warrant, probable
cause, or reasonable suspicion, see Ricardo Bascuas, Fourth Amendment Lessons From the
Highway and the Subway: A Principled Approach to Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J.
719, 724-25 (2007), depending on a balance of privacy interests and government objectives. See
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 864 (2006). Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding
standard than probable cause and requires only specific and articulable facts that suggest an
individual is engaged in criminal activity. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)
(holding that flight from police officers in a high crime area is sufficient to find reasonable
suspicion).
16. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) ("[Slome quantum of
individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure.").
17. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 447, 451-52 (2000).
18. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) ("Taking action, unrelated to the
objectives of the authorized intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment
or its contents, did produce a new invasion of privacy, unjustified by the exigent circumstance that
validated the entry."); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985) (stating that a search of
schoolchildren "will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related
to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the
student and the nature of the infraction"); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969)
(search incident to arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) ("When an officer has probable
cause to search a car, she may only search in places where the items in question may reasonably
be located including any container in the vehicle.").
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Congress broad powers "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations"' 9 and Congress has used this power to give the Executive "ple-
nary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border,
without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the collection
of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this coun-
try."2 0 Under the "warrant preference" approach, the border search doc-
trine is an exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements of
the Fourth Amendment. 2 1 Under the "generalized reasonableness the-
ory," the government's interest in preventing the entry of unwanted per-
sons and items has been said to be "at its zenith" at the international
border,2 2 and the individual's expectation of privacy lower at the
border.23
B. History of the Border Exception
Searches at the United States border have not been subject to tradi-
tional Fourth Amendment protections since the Bill of Rights was cre-
ated.2 4 The justifications for the exception, however, have evolved over
time as newly perceived threats at the border have emerged. The same
Congress that framed the Fourth Amendment also passed a statute
allowing for warrantless searches at the border for the regulation of
import duties.2 1 One hundred years later, in United States v. Boyd, the
Court still focused on the government's financial interest in taxing
imports.2 6 However, forty years after Boyd, when there was a concern
over importation of contraband during prohibition,27 the Court adopted a
national security justification for the exception. The Court concluded
that "national self protection" made it reasonable for border agents to
search vehicles to determine if the individuals were entitled to enter the
country and if their effects could be lawfully brought in.28
The Supreme Court did not explicitly allow routine suspicionless
19. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
20. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004) (quoting United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 453 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)).
21. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting
Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. Rev. 1468, 1473-74
(1985)).
22. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152.
23. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 539.
24. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5 §§ 23-24, 1 Stat. 29, 43; Untied States v. Ramsey, 431
U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
25. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5 §§ 23-24, 1 Stat. 29, 43.
26. See 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886).
27. See Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American
Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1, 118-22
(2006).
28. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
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searches until 1985 in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,2 9 during
a substantial escalation of the "war on drugs."30 The Court relied on
Ramsey and United States v. Carroll to show that routine suspicionless
searches were well established,' although "neither of those decisions
went that far."32 In United States v. Ramsey, the Court concluded that
probable cause was not required to open international mail suspected of
containing drugs based on "the recognized right of the sovereign to con-
trol . .. who and what may enter the country."33 Courts continue to rely
on the long history of the border exception to support the idea that mod-
em suspicionless border searches are firmly established in history.3 4
This reliance is misplaced because modem border searches have evolved
substantially from the first border statute. The statute passed by the First
Congress reflected a financial interest in searching at the border," while
the power to search at the border is now considered necessary to prevent
smuggling and to prevent prohibited and dangerous items from entering
the United States.3 6 The officials only had the power to search when
there was "reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to
duty shall be concealed."37 Some of the modem statutes authorizing cus-
toms officers to search at the border now omit the "reason to suspect"
language, which courts have interpreted to allow customs officials to
conduct routine searches without any suspicion at all.39 Although the
29. 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985); Christopher Lee, Comment, The Viability of Area Warrants in
a Suspicionless Search Regime, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1015, 1025 (2009).
30. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 573 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1985) (stating that
concern for the protection of the border is "heightened by the veritable national crisis in law
enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics"); Diane Michele Krasnow, To Stop the
Scourge: The Supreme Court's Approach to the War on Drugs, 19 Am. J. CRIM. L. 219, 226
(1992).
31. See Montoya de Hernandez, 431 U.S. at 538 n. .
32. Lee, supra note 29, at 1024; see also United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 615 n.10
(1977) (finding it unnecessary to decide the level of suspicion required under other statutory
authority because customs officials had reasonable cause to suspect a violation of customs laws, as
required by 19 U.S.C. § 482); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154.
33. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619-21.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Courts have long
held that searches of closed containers and their contents can be conducted at the border without
particularized suspicion under the Fourth Amendment."); Rahman v. Chertoff, 530 F.3d 622, 624
(7th Cir. 2008) ("The modem statute . . . derived from a statute passed by the First Congress ...
and reflects the 'impressive historical pedigree' of the Government's power and interest." (quoting
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 (1983))); United States v. Whitted, 541
F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 505 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619).
35. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 23-24, 1 Stat. 29, 43.
36. See, e.g., Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618-19 (quoting United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film,
413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973)).
37. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43.
38. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2000).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004); United States v.
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border exception has a long history, the explicit recognition of suspi-
cionless searches at the border is fairly new, and the original justification
for border searches has expanded substantially since the first border
statute.
C. Modem Border Searches and Reasonableness
Although border searches are exempt from the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement, they are still subject to the reasonableness require-
ment.4 0 Courts have found that reasonableness only requires officials to
have some level of suspicion when the search is either nonroutine, or
destructive.41
In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, the Court first articu-
lated two different levels of searches at the border; routine searches and
nonroutine searches.42 Routine searches at the border do not require rea-
sonable suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant, while nonroutine
searches do require reasonable suspicion.43 The distinction turns on the
extent to which the search is an invasion of privacy, as balanced against
the government's interest to search at the border." Pat-downs, frisks,
luggage searches, and automobile searches are all considered routine
searches that do not require any level of individualized suspicion.4 5
According to several courts, this category also includes searches of the
files on laptops and other electronic storage devices.46
Nonroutine searches involve a high degree of intrusion and often
involve the exposure of intimate body parts.47 The Supreme Court iden-
tified body cavity, x-ray, and strip searches as nonroutine. 8 Courts have
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985); United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 504 (4th
Cir. 2005).
40. See, e.g., Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537-38; United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d
116, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1994).
41. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152, 155-56.
42. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538, 541.
43. See, e.g., id. at 538; United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977); Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973).
44. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152.
45. See Denson v. United States, 574 F.3d 1318, 1340 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Whitted, 541 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Irving, 352 F.3d 110, 124-25 (2d Cir.
2006).
46. See United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Singh,
295 F. App'x 190, 190 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Linarez-Delgado, 259 F. App'x 506,
507-08 (3d Cir. 2007); Singh v. Scott, No. CV 08-86-GF-SHE, 2009 WL 2370636, at *5 (D.
Mont. July 29, 2009). United States v. Bunty, No. 07-641, 2008 WL 2371211, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
June 10, 2008); United States v. Hampe, No. 07-3-B-W, 2007 WL 1192365, at *4 (D. Me. Apr.
18, 2007).
47. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152; United States v. Barrow, 448 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir.
2006); United States v. Tsai, 282 F.3d 690, 694 (9th Cir. 2002).
48. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 437 U.S. 531, 537 (1985).
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drawn distinctions between total strip searches and other searches that
only necessitate exposure of body parts commonly shown in public.4 9
However, in United States v. Flores-Montano, the Court limited the
classification of searches as nonroutine, stating that "[c]omplex balanc-
ing tests to determine what is a 'routine' vehicle search, as opposed to a
more 'intrusive' search of a person, have no place in border searches of
vehicles."5 0 Several courts have interpreted Flores-Montano to hold that
the routine and nonroutine distinction is inapplicable to searches of
property; therefore, the only time the search of property requires reason-
able suspicion is when the search is destructive.5'
This is not a necessary result of Flores-Montano because the hold-
ing was limited to vehicles. One court after Flores-Montano classified
the search of a passenger cabin of a ship as nonroutine because it is more
like a home, expanding the category of nonroutine beyond physical bod-
ily intrusion.52 In that case, the court distinguished the facts from Flo-
res-Montano, stating "[w]hereas the 'dignity and privacy interests of the
person' do not carry over to border searches of an automobile, the pri-
vacy interests of an individual in his or her living quarters are signifi-
cantly greater and compel more rigorous Fourth Amendment
protection." 53 This case illustrates that Flores-Montano did not com-
pletely preclude the possibility that the search of property can be intru-
sive enough as to be considered nonroutine. The distinction between
bodily searches and the search of property at the border has important
implications when applied to laptops because there would be nothing
limiting the reasonable scope of a laptop search, so long as the search
isn't destructive. Although the possibility of classifying property as
nonroutine may have been left open by the Court, lower courts have
generally rejected arguments that laptops should be classified as such.54
III. APPLICATION OF THE REASONABLENESS REQUIREMENT TO THE
CONTENTS OF LAPTOPS
For searches of files stored on a laptop, courts have found the rea-
sonableness requirements is met "simply by virtue of the fact that they
49. See, e.g., United States v. Ramos-Saenz, 36 F.3d 59, 61 (9th Cir. 1994) (removing shoes
does not reach the degree of intrusiveness present in strip and body cavity searches); United States
v. Charleus, 871 F.2d 265, 268 (2d Cir. 1989) (lifting up a man's shirt considered routine).
50. 541 U.S. at 152.
51. See United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 997 n. 11(9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Flores-Montano, 424 F.3d 1044,
1049 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2005).
52. See United States v. Whitted, 541 F.3d 480, 488 (3d Cir. 2008).
53. Whitted, 541 F.3d at 488.
54. See, e.g., Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008; United States v. Singh, 295 F. App'x 190, 190 (9th
Cir. 2008).
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occur at the border,"" regardless whether there is any individualized
suspicion and without any limitations in scope. Applying the privacy
balancing test, courts have only found two categories of searches where
the privacy invasion is high enough to require individualized suspicion
at the border-bodily intrusions, and intrusions into areas that are like a
home." Therefore, everything else at the border, such as luggage,
requires no individualized suspicion. As a result, border search cases
have turned on the strength of dueling analogies.
Several defendants have argued that the search of data contained
within a laptop at the border should require some level of individualized
suspicion because they are extremely private. But courts have generally
rejected these arguments and held that the search of electronic storage
devices at the United States border is routine and does not require any
level of individualized suspicion."
On July 17, 2005, Michael Arnold landed at Los Angeles Interna-
tional Airport." Customs officials were inspecting his luggage when
they came across a laptop, and they asked Arnold to boot it up.59 The
desktop displayed several icons and folders, two of which were entitled
"Kodak photos" and "Kodak memories."6 0 The officers clicked on those
folders and examined the photos on Arnold's laptop, one of which
depicted two nude women.6 1 He was then questioned and detained by
special agents for several hours while the files on his computer were
further inspected.62 Several pictures depicting child pornography were
found on his computer.63 The district court granted Arnold's motion to
suppress the photos because the government conducted the search with-
out reasonable suspicion."4 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
"reasonable suspicion is not needed for customs officials to search a
laptop or other personal electronic storage device at the border." 6 5 In
55. See, e.g., Amold 533 F.3d at 1006.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 437 U.S. 531, 537 (1985); United
States v. Whitted, 541 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2008).
57. See Amold, 533 F.3d at 1008; United States v. Singh, 295 F. App'x 190, 190 (9th Cir.
2008); United States v. Linarez-Delgado, 259 F. App'x 506, 507-08 (3d Cir. 2007); Singh v.
Scott, No. CV 08-86-GF-SHE, 2009 WL 2370636, at *5 (D. Mont. July 29, 2009). United States
v. Bunty, No. 07-641, 2008 WL 2371211, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 2008); United States v. Hampe,
No. 07-3-B-W, 2007 WL 1192365, at *4 (D. Me. Apr. 18, 2007).
58. Amold, 533 F.3d at 1005.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (overruled by United
States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008)).
65. Amold, 533 F.3d at 1008.
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Arnold, the court reasoned that the search of a laptop or other electronic
device is not logically any different from the search of a traveler's lug-
gage, rejecting the defendant's argument that the search of a laptop is
more like the search of a home based on a laptop's storage capacity.66
Another district court rejected the argument that the search of a
computer is analogous to a bodily search in United States v. McAuley.6 7
A defendant even argued, in United States v. Cotterman, that searching a
laptop is the equivalent of a body cavity search because a laptop "is
likely to hold an individual's most private thoughts and information." 6 8
The court found that it was "not a case of a body cavity search where
reasonable suspicion would be required because of the personal intru-
siveness of the search," 69 but instead found reasonable suspicion was
required because it was an "extended border search,""0 which occurred
170 miles from the border and took thirty six hours.71 The privacy focus
has also spawned extensive arguments describing the vast amount of
storage capacity computers have72 and the types of information they
may contain,7 3 in order to make them comparable to the human mind or
an extension of the person.74
These cases reflect a problem with the balancing test at the border
66. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009 (9th Cir. 2008).
67. See 563 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
68. No. CR 07-1207-TUC-RCC, 2009 WL 465028, at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 24, 2009).
69. Id. at *4. -
70. Extended border searches occur when a search is removed in time and place from the
border and must be justified by reasonable suspicion. Id. at *5.
71. See id. at *9.
72. See, e.g., Brief for Association of Corporate Travel Executives and Electronic Frontier
Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee at 14, United States v. Arnold, 533
F.3d 1003 (2008) (No. 05-772) ("The volume of information stored on computers means that the
privacy invasion of a laptop border search is enormous."); Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a
Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REv. 531, 569 (2005); Sarah M. Smith, Comment, Searches of
Computers and Computer Data at the United States Border: The Need for a New Framework
Following United States v. Arnold, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 69, 71 (2009) (protection of
personal information is critical due to the "ability of electronic devices to store vast amounts of
... information").
73. See, e.g., Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 13, United States v. Singh, No. 07-30421 13
(9th Cir. 2008); Ordean L. Volker, Lawyers, Laptops, and the Border, 72 TEX. B. J. 640, 641
(2009); Erick Lucadamo, Note, Reading Your Mind at the Border: Searching Memorialized
Thoughts and Memories on Your Laptop and United States v. Arnold, 54 VILL. L. REv. 541, 574
(2009) (listing privileged information and trade secrets); Kindal Wright, Comment, Border
Searches in a Modern World: Are Laptops Merely Closed Containers, or are They Something
More?, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 701, 721 (2009) ("precious memories").
74. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000 (overruled by United States
v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008)) (finding that Fourth Amendment protection extends to
the search of this type of personal and private information at the border, because "electronic
storage devices function as an extension of our own memory"); Brief for Defendant-Appellant at
13, United States v. Singh, No. 07-30421 13 (9th Cir. 2008) ("What the government ignores is
how a search of a laptop is really the equivalent of a search of someone's personal thoughts.").
LAPTOPS AND THE BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION
because they don't comply with the public's expectations and because
they are not supported by the purpose of the border exception as dis-
cussed in Part IV. A computer probably doesn't stand much of a chance
at being more like a person's cavity than a briefcase; however, there is
still something different about searching a laptop, as opposed to luggage,
that makes people generally uncomfortable." It shows that there is a
strong privacy interest in the contents of a laptop. But people aren't sur-
prised when their physical papers, diaries and photo albums can be
searched at the border. So, why are people so surprised when they learn
that their laptops can be searched without suspicion? It might be the
amount of information a laptop can contain, but it is likely something
more than that. It shows that generally travelers don't expect that the
government can do that, despite all the searches that are regularly con-
ducted at the border. People don't expect that their laptops can be
searched because it seems on an intuitive level that something about it
doesn't make sense. People accept that their personal items need to be
searched at the border in order to regulate importation of contraband and
dangerous items. The surprise, therefore, may reflect an understanding
that the search of electronic files is not supported by the justification for
the border exception in the first place; they aren't going to find bombs,
drugs, or disease wielding fruits within a computer.
IV. THE PURPOSE OF THE BORDER EXCEPTION
The purpose of exempting searches at the border from traditional
Fourth Amendment protections does not justify electronic informational
searches without suspicion. The purpose of the border exception is to
regulate who and what may enter the country in order to intercept pro-
hibited or dutiable items and things that would be dangerous to the
country such as bombs, weapons, communicable diseases, narcotics, or
explosives.76 However, courts do not consider this rationale when evalu-
ating the reasonableness of border searches. As discussed above, the
only limitations to the scope of a suspicionless border search turns on
intrusiveness, or whether a search is destructive." The application of the
reasonableness requirement is also limited by the Supreme Court's cir-
75. See supra note 3.
76. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 453 U.S. 531, 544 (1985); United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 591 (1983); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413
U.S. 123, 125 (1973); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); United States v.
Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 886 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 733
(1985) (citing Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1966)) ('The primary
purpose of a border search is to seize contraband property sought to be brought into the country.").
77. United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (1977)).
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cular reasoning that although the reasonableness requirement applies at
the border, routine border searches are reasonable by virtue of the fact
they occur at the border."
A. Proposed Analysis of Border Searches
Like other searches under the Fourth Amendment, the reasonable-
ness of searches at the border should also depend on the scope of the
intrusion, the manner of its conduct, and the justification for its initia-
tion." Under the current analysis, the manner of the search only matters
if the search of property is destructive, and the scope is only limited by
whether the intrusion is comparable to a cavity search or the search of a
home. It does not matter whether the initial search is justified by to the
need to intercept dangerous item, or whether the scope is limited to
enforcing customs laws. The purpose of the border exception should
play a larger role in the classification of a border search as nonroutine.
This analysis would allow for the protection of privacy that courts are
concerned with in regards to cavity searches, as well as limit the scope
of a routine search to the purpose and rationale for exempting searches
at the border in the first place.
1. THE RATIONALE OF THE BORDER EXCEPTION DOES NOT JUSTIFY
INITIATING A SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC FILES
A search at the border that does not rationally fit within the purpose
of the border exception should be considered nonroutine. The justifica-
tion of the border exception has expanded over time, reflecting the
changing concerns at the border, such as importation of alcohol during
the prohibition and the rise of international narcotics trafficking.80 Mod-
ern courts have described the border exception as being necessary to
intercepting prohibited or dutiable items and things that would be dan-
gerous to the country such as bombs, weapons, communicable diseases,
narcotics, or explosives."' Put more simply, the purpose is to regulate
78. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616.
79. See United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1982).
80. The national security justification for the border exception was first adopted when there
was a concern about illegal importation of alcohol during prohibition. See Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the
American Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1,
118-22 (2006). The Supreme Court first explicitly recognized routine suspicionless border
searches in 1985 during a substantial escalation of the "war on drugs." See United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 573 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1985) (stating that concern for the protection of
the border is "heightened by the veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by smuggling
of illicit narcotics"); Diane Michele Krasnow, To Stop the Scourge: The Supreme Court's
Approach to the War on Drugs, 19 Am. J. CRIM. L. 219, 226 (1992).
81. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 453 U.S. 531, 544 (1985); United States v.
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who and what may enter the country. In addition to the collection of tax
on dutiable items, the ability to search at the border is necessary to regu-
late the importation of dangerous items and prevent the spread of disease
that can be contained in things like fruits and vegetables. Border
searches should be treated uniquely for these purposes, but once the
search extends well beyond the logical purpose, the search should be
subject to some level of suspicion. In a concurring opinion, Judge
Berzon recognized that:
a search which happens to be at the border but is not motivated by
either of these two "national self protection" interests [regulating who
and what may enter the country] may not be "routine" in the sense
that term is used in the border search cases, as it is not within the
rationale for declaring such searches reasonable without a warrant or
probable cause.82
The emphasis on privacy in the context of border searches often
eliminates a discussion of the purpose behind the border exception in
determining the scope of a routine search. The cases start from the
premise that everything can be searched at the border unless it is private
or the search is destructive. The reasonableness of laptop searches at the
border should be based upon whether the purpose and the rationale
behind the border exception justify the search of a device that can only
contain data. Because the distinction between routine and nonroutine
searches at the border has centered on degrees of privacy intrusion, argu-
ments regarding what level of suspicion should be required for a particu-
lar search depend on strained analogies to things the court has
considered sufficiently private at the border. Several courts have found
that the suspicionless search of a passenger cabin of a ship is nonroutine
because it is more like a home,84 which reflects the high regard courts
have for the privacy of the home in ordinary Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence. In United States v. Sanders, the defendant argued that a search
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 591 (1983); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413
U.S. 123, 125 (1973); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); United States v.
Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 886 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 733
(1985) (citing Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1966)) ("The primary
purpose of a border search is to seize contraband property sought to be brought into the country.").
82. United States v. Tsai, 282 F.3d 690, 699 (9th Cir. 2002) (Berzon, J., concurring).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008) (briefly
mentioning the justification of the doctrine and focusing on whether the search of a laptop is
intrusive or destructive); United States v. Ramos-Saenz, 36 F.3d 59, 61 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding a
border search is nonroutine only when it reaches the degree of intrusiveness present in a strip
search or body cavity search); United States v. McAuley, 563 F. Supp. 2d 672, 676 (W.D. Tex.
2008) ("The key variable . . . is 'the invasion of the privacy and dignity of the individual."'
(quoting United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163, 1167 (5th Cir. 1981))).
84. See United States v. Whitted, 541 F.3d 480, 488 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v.
Cunningham, No. 98-265, 1996 WL 665747, at *3 (E.D. La. 1996).
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of an artificial leg was analogous to the search of a body cavity.85 The
fact that many people are alarmed that the government can search com-
puter files at the border reflects how the courts understanding of privacy
and the government's needs at the border do not converge with what the
public understands the purpose of border searches to be. Instead of the
level of suspicion being determined by arbitrary analogies, reasonable-
ness should depend on whether the border exception makes sense in the
context of files on a computer. The files on a laptop do not have the
capacity to contain items that justify suspicionless searches at the
border.
Several authors have criticized the application of the border excep-
tion to outbound travelers, arguing that the rationale for the border
exception does not support suspcionless exit searches.8 6 Although the
Supreme Court has not addressed the validity of exit border searches, the
lower courts have stated that the purpose is to search for exportation of
money, which is related to the importation of drugs, and weapons."
First, this has been criticized because the fact that an outgoing container
is brought into contact with the border should not render the border
exception applicable because there is no "nexus between the search and
the border."" Second, the border exception should not be used to trans-
form a search that would be impermissible inland into a permissible one
at the border when the need is no greater at the border than anywhere
within the country." As discussed, similar criticisms can be said about
the application of the border exception to electronic storage devices.
However, it is even more interesting that courts felt the need to connect
export searches to the importation of drugs-the courts do not just claim
that the border is a special place where a person's rights disappear.
2. THE SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC FILES FALLS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF
A REASONABLE BORDER SEARCH
The reasonable scope of a suspicionless border search should be
limited not only by intrusiveness, but also by whether the invasion is
supported by the rationale of the border exception. All searches under
the Fourth Amendment, whether authorized by a warrant, probable
85. See 663 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir.1981).
86. See, e.g., Nancy L. Dzwonczyk, Criminal Procedure-Application of the "Border
Search" Exception to Existing Individuals-United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136 (3d Cir.
1991), 65 TEamp. L. REv. 309, 318 (1992); Harris J. Yale, Beyond the Border of Reasonableness:
Exports, Imports, and the Border Exception, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 733, 770-71 (1983).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Odutayo, 406 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 26 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1991).
88. Yale, supra note 86, at 22.
89. Id.
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cause, or pursuant to an exception, must be limited in scope to the cir-
cumstances which justify the intrusion in the first place. In Terry v.
Ohio, the court upheld a protective search of a person's outer clothing
based on reasonable suspicion and the scope was limited to what justi-
fied the exception in the first place, "the protection of the police officer
and others nearby;" therefore, the scope of the search was confined to
"an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or
other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer."90
Although searches at the border are unique based on the long stand-
ing "plenary authority" of the executive, the permissible scope of a rou-
tine border search should similarly be limited to what justifies the
suspicionless search at the border. The purpose of the border exception
should not be expanded to justify purely informational searches, beyond
identification of the individual seeking entry because the government's
interest in searching data and information is lower,9 ' and there is no
greater need to search computers at the border than anywhere else
already in the United States. The government may "engage in suspi-
cionless border searches where there is an interest unique to the border,
such as preventing people from entering illegally or in intercepting drugs
or weapons being brought into the country"; however, "these interests
do not exist with regard to the memory of computers."9 2 Other than the
location where the search would take place, the search of laptop files has
little to do at all with the borders; there is nothing exceptional or danger-
ous about information, ideas, and data being physically carried across
the border on a hard drive that makes it more reasonable to search than
the same data, located on the same hard drive, on your desk at home.
Although the exception has evolved from a purely financial inter-
est, the purpose should not be expanded to include general law enforce-
ment and uncovering terrorist materials without suspicion. Searches of a
traveler's car, purse, briefcase, and luggage are consistent with the rea-
sonable justifications of a border search. Taking a laptop out, and mak-
ing sure that it doesn't contain explosives or contraband is also
consistent. Even some things classified as nonroutine, for privacy rea-
sons, are consistent with this rationale; drugs can be hidden in a person's
cavity. However, clicking through the files on a laptop, and reading
documents and emails falls outside the reasonable purpose of the border
exception because "[t]he government has no special interest at the bor-
der in searching a person's computer different from computers that are
90. See 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
91. Discussed infra Part V.A.
92. Erwin Chemerinsky, Laptop Search at Border Was Illegal, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 29, 2006,
at 6.
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already in the country."9
The way that courts treat the scope of searches of electronic devices
in other Fourth Amendment exceptions is informative. A search incident
to a lawful arrest permits an officer to search the arrestee's person and
the area within the arrestee's immediate control without a warrant in
order to remove weapons and to prevent the concealment or destruction
of evidence.9 4 Although no federal case has addressed the validity of a
computer search incident to arrest, several have addressed the search of
cell phones incident to arrest. Courts have reached different decisions on
whether a search incident to arrest extends to the contents of a cell
phone. One court held that a search incident to arrest did not extend to
cell phones where the defendant was arrested for driving on a suspended
license and the officers smelled marijuana.9 5 The court stated that the
search was not related to officer safety or the preservation of evidence
related to the crime of the arrest, but was instead a fishing expedition for
evidence of drug activity. 96 Another court stated that cell phones may
not be searched incident to arrest, as the contents of a cell phone present
no risk of danger to arresting officers, and because "searching through
information stored on a cell phone is analogous to a search of a sealed
letter, which requires a warrant."" Many courts, on the other hand, have
upheld the search of a cell phone incident to arrest; those cases reasoned
that there was a risk that evidence would be destroyed because incoming
calls would crowd out existing ones. The treatment of the search of
electronic devices incident to arrest is limited to what justifies the excep-
tion in the first place. Suspicionless searches of the same devices at the
United States border should similarly require some relationship to the
reasonable justifications for the border exception.
In a case regarding a warrant served on Google for the search of an
e-mail account, a district court held that it did not comply with the War-
rants Clause because it was too general; there was no provision limiting
the emails to be seized to those containing evidence of the crimes
93. Id.
94. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
95. United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
96. See id. (finding the search of cell phone incident to arrest improper because the search
"had nothing to do with officer safety or the preservation of evidence related to the crime of
arrest," but rather was a fishing expedition for evidence of drug activity).
97. See United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR., 2008 WL 5381412, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec.
22, 2008).
98. See United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Finley,
477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir.1996);
United States v. Santillan, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1102 (D. Ariz. 2008).
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charged or of any specific crime at all.9 9 Without the scope of border
searches being limited to the justification of the border search doctrine,
the exception seems similar to general warrants-the concern that
underlies the Fourth Amendment in the first place.'" Under general
warrants "customs officials were given blanket authority to conduct gen-
eral searches for goods imported to the Colonies in violation of the tax
laws of the crown.""o' The Fourth Amendment rejects the use of general
warrants by requiring that a warrant "particularly describe the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized."o 2 The district court
quoted United States v. George, stating that "authorization to search for
'evidence of a crime,' that is to say, any crime, is so broad as to consti-
tute a general warrant. . . . [A] fortiori, a warrant not limited in scope to
any crime at all is . . . unconstitutionally broad."o Similarly, if the
search of property is not limited in scope at the border, suspicionless
searches of files contained within a laptop would be analogous to what
the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect against: general
warrants. 1'"
B. The Border Search of Laptop Files Only Serves General
Law Enforcement Purposes
The border search doctrine should not be used "for a purpose unre-
lated to border control-such as general crime prevention . . . ."'o Cus-
toms officials are not subject to the same Fourth Amendment
requirements as general law enforcement officers specifically because
"[t]he primordial purpose of a search by Customs officers is not to
apprehend persons, but to seize contraband property unlawfully
imported or brought into the United States."II Therefore, the reason that
customs officials can generally act without any level of suspicion is
because "customs officials have special limited powers to enforce the
customs laws; they do not have the general investigatory or law enforce-
ment authority of police officers." 0 '
99. See United States v. Cioffi, No. 08-CR-415 (FB), 2009 WL 3738314, at *9 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 2, 2009).
100. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967).
101. Id.
102. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
103. Cioffi, No. 08-CR-415 (FB), 2009 WL 3738314, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2009) (quoting
United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 76-77 (2d. Cir. 1992)).
104. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168-69 (2008) (citing Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 624-27 (1886)).
105. United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
106. United States v. Sahanaja, 430 F.3d 1049, 1053 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005); Alexander v. United
States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1966).
107. Klein v. United States, 472 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1973); People v. LaPiera, 611
N.Y.S.2d 394, 398 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (emphasis added).
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However, the Department of Homeland Security sees the role of
customs differently; explaining that searches of electronic media are
"vital to detecting information that poses serious harm to the United
States, including terrorist plans, or constitutes criminal activity."'os The
role of the customs officer seems to be expanding and is becoming more
difficult to distinguish from general law enforcement. The border should
not be just a special place where the government has a good excuse to
rummage around in people's stuff in hopes of finding anything that vio-
lates any kind of law without being subject to traditional Fourth Amend-
ment requirements.
1. THE DANGERS OF USING THE BORDER EXCEPTION FOR
GENERAL LAw ENFORCEMENT
Allowing customs officials to have free access to every file on a
traveler's computer will likely result in the border exception being used
as an excuse to snoop computers for reasons unrelated to customs laws.
The same court that upheld the suspicionless search of Arnold's laptop
stated, in United States v. Bulacan, that "courts must take care to ensure
that [a suspicionless] search is not subverted into a general search for
evidence of crime," emphasizing the "vast potential for abuse" and
intrusion "into the privacy of ordinary citizens.""' Furthermore, the
government has the same need to search data at the border as it does to
search data inside computers already in the United States. "In the con-
text of searching a laptop's data, the doctrine would require the exis-
tence of something special about searching the data at the physical
border relative to searching data in computers already inside the coun-
try."" 0o Searching for possession of things like copyright infringement' 11
is no more necessary at the border than it is anywhere else in the United
States.
2. BORDER SEARCHES ARE COMPARABLE TO "SPECIAL
NEEDS" SEARCHES
Border searches have evolved in a way that makes them similar to
suspicionless "special needs" searches. Under the "special needs" doc-
trine, suspicionless searches may be conducted when the government's
108. Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Napolitano Announces New
Directives on Border Searches of Electronic Media (Aug. 27, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/
releases/pr _1251393255852.shtm (emphasis added).
109. 156 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 1998).
110. Ari B. Fontecchio, Note, Suspicionless Laptop Searches Under the Border Search
Doctrine: The Fourth Amendment Exception That Swallows Your Laptop, 31 CARDOzo L. REv.
231, 255 (2008).
111. Press Release, supra note 108.
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interest, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, outweighs the
individual's privacy interest.'" 2 This means the government must state a
reason for conducting the search that is separate from criminal law
enforcement in order for the "special needs" doctrine to apply. Those
searches are also not blanket searches, but are limited in scope to a spe-
cific goal." 3 Because the border exception has expanded beyond the
need to regulate duties to include national security interests and importa-
tion of contraband' , the Court created a balancing test, similar to the
"special needs" test in order to distinguish between routine and nonrou-
tine searches. However, unlike "special needs" searches, the balancing
test at the border does not seem to be limited, in practice, to searches
that are separate from general law enforcement, and searches at the bor-
der are not limited to the justifiable scope of the justified intrusion.
C. The Utility of Laptop Searches Undermines the Application of
the Border Exception
The government's interest in searching the files on a laptop at the
border is lower because the same data contained within every laptop can
float across the border via the internet; therefore, border searches aren't
that effective in preventing "dangerous data" from entering the United
States. The lack of utility of such searches demonstrate how the border
exception is being used as an excuse to do general crime searches with-
out justification. The changes in the justification for the border excep-
tion have historically reflected newly perceived threats where the border
is the rational point of defense."' However, information does not need
to be carried across the physical border in order to enter the United
States. Intercepting data, such as evidence of a terrorist plot, child por-
nography, or financial records at the nation's border cannot prevent its
entry into the United States. Any terrorist can e-mail files across the
border without having to physically transport them across the United
States border and be protected by the Fourth Amendment. Illegal photos
or other informational contraband will still enter the United States due to
the nature of electronic communications.
Furthermore, this policy has the potential to extend to international
e-mail. In deciding that the border exception should apply to interna-
tional mail, the Supreme Court stated that "there is nothing in the ratio-
nale behind the border-search exception which suggests that the mode of
112. Ferguson v. Chalreston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 n.7 (2001).
113. Id. at 79.
114. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
115. Id.
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entry will be critical."I1 6 This makes it even more plausible that the bor-
der exception will encompass things like international e-mail, a far
departure from what justifies the exception in the first place. One author
even argued that "if the constitutional protections against unreasonable
search and seizure, the right to due process, and other individual rights
are not considered to be abrogated in physical border inspections, then it
seems reasonable that appropriately narrow Internet border inspections
should also survive a constitutional test."'" 7
V. ELECTRONIC FILES CAN ONLY CONTAIN DATA AND INFORMATION
WHICH UNDERMINES THE REASONABLENESS OF
SEARCHING AT THE BORDER
Even at the border, the Fourth Amendment is incompatible with
suspicionless informational searches. The border search doctrine has his-
torically authorized extensive and highly discretionary searches. In the
past, however, travelers had never carried an item across the border that
was only capable of containing data and information, a characteristic
that makes laptops significantly distinguishable from ordinary contain-
ers. Most containers, and indeed even bodily cavities, may be immedi-
ately dangerous to the United States because of their ability to conceal
dangerous tangible items, not because of the information they contain.
Information, by its nature, presents less of an immediate threat than ordi-
nary objects. Many authors and courts have found that a laptop is not
distinguishable in any way from other containers, one author argued
that:
laptop searches are not unique in their ability to reveal sensitive, per-
sonal information. Travelers might cross the border with letters,
address books, photo albums, and similar items. . . . It is hard to see
why data stored electronically should be afforded stronger privacy
protections than the same data would be if it were stored
physically.'s
Photo albums, journals, novels and other First Amendment materi-
als are all capable of concealing drugs or weapons-a file on a computer
or a Blackberry is not. Even a person's cavity-a search of which
requires reasonable suspicion-is capable of containing drugs while a
file on a computer never could. Computers are not only unique in the
116. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977).
117. Captain Oren K. Upton, Asserting National Sovereignty in Cyberspace: The Case for
Internet Border Inspection (June 2003) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School),
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD-ADA417582&Location=U2&doc=getTRDoc.pdf.
118. Nathan Alexander Sales, Run for the Border: Laptop Searches and the Fourth
Amendment, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1091, 1115 (2009).
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information and data they contain-they are unique in their inability to
contain anything other than information and data.
Because the distinction between routine and nonroutine searches
turns on privacy and intrusiveness in order to require some level of sus-
picion, laptops must either be more like an extension of private body
parts or a home. Instead courts have found it is more like a suitcase. The
problem with these arguments is that it is not about how much data, or
what kind of data a laptop contains-it is simply that it is data. The
authority to search a laptop at the border should not depend on whether
it is similar enough to a small list of things that judges consider to be
sufficiently private at the border; it should turn on whether it is reasona-
ble to search for information that has little to do with customs laws at
the border. The authority to open a laptop to search for physical objects
without suspicion should not extend to the information contained within
the laptop.
A. The First Amendment and Border Searches of
Expressive Material
The history of the border search exception illustrates that the doc-
trine was not initially intended to eliminate Fourth Amendment protec-
tions of personal papers. In Boyd, the case which courts have cited to
support the historical strength of the border search doctrine,"' the
Supreme Court stated that "the search for and seizure of stolen or for-
feited goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the pay-
ment thereof, are totally different things from a search for and seizure of
a man's private books and papers for the purposes of obtaining informa-
tion therein contained . . . ."20 The Constitution protects the right to
receive information and ideas,' 2 ' which is "fundamental to our free soci-
ety."' 2 2 The Supreme Court, in New York v. P.J. Video, refused to
require a higher standard of probable cause for warrant applications
when expressive material is involved, holding "an application for a war-
rant authorizing the seizure of materials presumptively protected by the
First Amendment should be evaluated under the same standard of proba-
ble cause used to review warrant applications generally."' 23
Relying on P.J. Video, the Fourth Circuit then refused to create a
First Amendment exception to the border search doctrine because it
119. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hemandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985).
120. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1886).
121. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143 (1943).
122. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
123. New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868, 874 (1986).
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believed that the Supreme Court had foreclosed this argument.12 4 In
United States v. Arnold, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning that such a rule would:
(1) protect terrorist communications "which are inherently 'expres-
sive' "; (2) create an unworkable standard for government agents who
"would have to decide-on their feet-which expressive material is cov-
ered by the First Amendment"; and (3) contravene the weight of
Supreme Court precedent refusing to subject government action to
greater scrutiny with respect to the Fourth Amendment when an
alleged First Amendment interest is also at stake.12 5
Other federal circuits addressing this issue have also held that
expressive materials are not exempt from the border search exception.12 6
First, requiring reasonable suspicion in order to conduct a search of
laptop files at the border may have the effect of sometimes protecting
terrorist communications; however, this justification is insufficient. The
argument has turned up elsewhere, such as in Flores-Montano, where
the Government argued that if a trunk can be searched without reasona-
ble suspicion but a gas tank cannot be, it will encourage terrorists to hide
materials in the gas tank. 12 7 But this argument is rejected elsewhere.
First of all, terrorists could also hide materials in their cavities, or send
the materials to themselves through the U.S. Postal Service, or via the
Internet.12 8 In United States v. United States District Court, the Court
addressed wiretaps that were used against citizens who were suspected
of conspiracy to bomb government property.' The Supreme Court bal-
anced the government interest to protect national security against the
invasion on individual privacy and unanimously found that some Fourth
Amendment safeguards were still necessary.3 0 Searching the files on a
laptop is similar to wiretapping because it is limited to ideas, informa-
tion and communications that can travel through the air waves.
Second, the Supreme Court's holding did not foreclose a First
Amendment defense to a border search. A suspicionless search pursuant
to a Fourth Amendment exception involves a different analysis than a
warrant application; it involves a balance of the government's interest
against the individual's interest. Because the reasonableness requirement
applies at the border, the interest in protecting the free flow of ideas
124. See United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 507 (4th Cir. 2005).
125. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008).
126. See United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1011 (9th Cir. 2008); Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509
F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2007).
127. Brief for the United States at 18, United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004)
(No. 02-1794).
128. Discussed infra Part V.B.
129. See 407 U.S. 297, 323-24 (1972).
130. See id. at 313.
[Vol. 65:9991020
LAPTOPS AND THE BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION
should weigh in favor of the individual's interest to be balanced against
the government interest. The strong weight of the individual's interest in
protecting the free flow of information is reflected in border cases
outside the context of laptops where courts seem to treat information
searches at the border with more caution than other items at the border.
Several courts have found that once a search of an envelope or
package reveals no contraband or dutiable items, a close reading or pho-
tocopying of the contents of documents requires reasonable suspicion."
Courts have also upheld a limited reading or examination of documents
found during a border search, but only to identify the objects them-
selves, 132 while emphasizing that "a reading for the purpose of revealing
the intellectual content of the writing requires encroachment upon first
amendment protections far beyond the mere search and seizure of mater-
ials."133 This caution exhibited by the courts reveals an implicit regard
for, or fear of invading, individual's First Amendment rights at the
border.
Third, requiring suspicion in order to search a laptop at the border
would not create an "unworkable standard" for officials because it is not
necessary to exempt all expressive materials from searches at the border
in order to protect the files on a computer. The requirement of reasona-
ble suspicion could be limited to items that are only capable of contain-
ing data and information. It is clear that officials may open a laptop,
journal, or photo album to inspect for physical objects, and even turn on
a laptop to make sure it isn't a bomb without suspicion, but that author-
ity should not extend to information contained within these items. The
government's interest in searching laptops at the border is attenuated
because of the futility of searching the contents of a laptop at the border,
and because the purpose of the border exception is not to reveal content
of writings. Therefore, because travelers' First Amendment interest in
the free flow of information weighs against the government, reasonable-
131. See, e.g., United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 738-39 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding
photocopying of documents and a map found in a carry-on bag during a border search because the
documents aroused the agents' suspicion of illegal conduct involving material or persons entering
or leaving the United States); United States v. Grayson, 597 F.2d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 1979)
(stating that where the defendant reluctantly removed papers from his breast pocket and crumbled
them after being asked by customs officials to empty his pockets, "such actions gave the
inspectors reason to suspect that the papers contained or related to contraband or were evidence of
items not declared by the defendant; this required that the papers be read"); United States v.
Schoor, 597 F.2d 1303, 1306 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that air cargo bills and other documents
were properly seized by custom officials upon notification that items were instrumentalities of
crime involving narcotics); United States v. Soto-Teran, 44 F. Supp. 2d 185, 191 (E.D.N.Y.1996).
But see United States v. Borello, 766 F.2d 46, 58 (2d Cir.1985) (holding customs officials may
screen materials to enforce obscenity laws without violating the First Amendment).
132. See, e.g., Heidy v. U.S. Customs Serv., 681 F. Supp. 1445, 1450 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
133. See id.
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ness requires that customs officials have some level of suspicion before
searching devices that are only capable of containing data and
information.
B. Data and Information in International Mail
Historically, the suspicionless reading of personal information and
correspondence would have been considered unreasonable. In 1792,
Congress made it a crime for Post Office employees to open any letter,
packet, or bag of letters.134 In 1866, Congress broadened the authority of
Customs officials to allow a search of "any vessel, beast, person or
envelope without suspicion."' There were concerns that the use of the
word "envelope" would be interpreted to allow inspection of personal
correspondence; however, the sponsor assured that "[t]here is no danger
of such a construction being placed upon this language."l 3 6
In United States v. Ramsey, the Supreme Court held that the same
constitutional standard should be applied regardless whether the item is
carried across the border, or crosses the border through international
mail.' Under 19 U.S.C. § 1583, customs officials are required to have
reasonable cause to suspect that an item contains contraband before
opening sealed envelopes carried by the U.S. Postal Service, and they
are flatly prohibited from reading correspondence in the absence of a
search warrant.138 Additionally, 19 C.F.R. § 145.3 prohibits customs
officials from reading correspondence contained in "any letter class
mail" absent prior authorization by search warrant or by written authori-
zation of the sender or the recipient. In Ramsey, the Supreme Court
declined to address whether customs inspectors could read correspon-
dence because "the reading of letters is totally interdicted by regula-
tion,"139 meaning, the statute that applied to the search conducted in the
case already required reasonable suspicion, which the inspectors had.140
The Ninth Circuit became the first court to uphold the supsicionless
reading of international correspondence in United States v. Seljan.14 '
The Court held that the scope of a search of international mail, author-
ized under 31 U.S.C. § 5317, was reasonable where the inspector
134. An Act to establish the Post-Office and Post Roads within the United States, 1 Stat. 232,
sec. 5 (1792).
135. Act of July 1866, 14 Stat. 178 § 2.
136. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 627 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., Ist Sess., 2596 (1866)).
137. Id. at 620.
138. 19 U.S.C. § 1583(c)(2) (2010).
139. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620.
140. Id.
141. 547 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2008).
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opened the package and "scanned" the letter to determine whether
defendant had violated monetary instrument reporting requirements, and
evidence of pedophilia could be ascertained "by a glance." 4 2
The Ninth Circuit-the same court that upheld the suspicionless
search of Arnold's computer less than four months earlier-seemed to
exercise extreme caution when dealing with a postal inspector reading
contents of communications. The court stated that it was necessary to
unfold the paper and look at what was printed on it in order to determine
whether it was a monetary instrument.14 3 The court repeatedly empha-
sized that the inspector did not "read" the letter, but instead "scanned" it,
relying on the plain view doctrine to find it was reasonable.'" Under the
plain view doctrine, if officers are lawfully in a position where they see
an object, the object's incriminating character is immediately apparent
and if the officers have lawful right of access to the object, they may
seize it without a warrant.145 "The initial intrusion can be justified by a
warrant or by one of the recognized exceptions of the warrant require-
ment"l 46 The court stated that the cursory "scanning" of the letter fell
under the plain view doctrine because the border exception gave the
official a lawful vantage point to open the letter, and the inspector
noticed "immediately apparent" evidence of pedophilia.14 7
The court implicitly recognized the scope of the border search was
limited by the purpose of the initial intrusion-to identify the letter
itself-and was not supposed to extend to private communications.
First, the court's emphasis on the inspector's method of "scanning," as
opposed to reading, the information reveals a special caution the court
seems to afford the reading of information, even at the border. The court
also emphasized that the purpose of the search was not to read the infor-
mation, but that the information was in plain view and immediately
apparent as contraband. If the border exception justified the reading of
communications, the court would not have had to rely on the plain view
doctrine to find the search was reasonable.
Similarly, when customs officials search a physical diary or photo
album, they are not supposed to be searching them for intellectual con-
tent; they are searching for contraband contained within the item. How-
ever, if customs officials come across other items during their search for
contraband, they are authorized to seize it. If the same standard is sup-
posed to apply to physical border searches, and border searches of inter-
142. Id. at 1004-05.
143. Id. at 1004.
144. Id. at 1005.
145. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 374-75 (1993).
146. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990).
147. United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1006 (9th Cir. 2008).
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national mail, why did the Ninth Circuit feel compelled to be more
protective over information contained within a piece of mail than infor-
mation contained within a laptop?
Although data on a laptop is probably most closely analogous to a
piece of international mail because they are both likely to contain private
information, ideas, and communications, there are some key differences
which would implicate that the suspicionless search of a laptop at the
border is even less justified than the search of international mail. First, a
letter is similar to other closed containers that are capable of storing
physical items, and laptop files can only store data and information. Sec-
ond, the Ninth Circuit, in Seljan, relied heavily on the plain view doc-
trine to justify the cursory scanning of correspondence.' 4 8 The same
rationale cannot support the search of files within a laptop because when
the physical laptop itself is searched, electronic files do not come into
plain view. Although the plain view doctrine might come into play when
a laptop is booted up to identify the object itself, it would be limited to
things that are immediately apparent as contraband on the desktop-a
much more limited scope than perusing all of the files. For example,
customs officials would be justified in turning on Arnolds computer to
make sure it wasn't a bomb; therefore if his desktop picture depicted
child pornography or maybe if the files on the desktop had been entitled
"nude kids" or "child porn" instead of "Kodak memories,"149 it may
have fallen under the plain view doctrine. It would be interesting to see
how the Ninth Circuit would decide a case in which a laptop was sent
through international mail. Although the court's decision in United
States v. Arnold would seem to allow a suspicionless search of all of the
files,'1 0 the court's decision in Seljan would seem to limit the search to
information in plain view,151 which, in the case of a laptop could only
extend to information immediately apparent as contraband on the
desktop. The protection of international correspondence provided by
statute combined with the caution exhibited by the only court to have
upheld the suspicionless "scanning" of correspondence undermine the
approval of customs officials reading information on a laptop. It does
not seem logical that the courts can say that the same standard should
apply to international mail and information physically traveling with a
person across the border, and at the same time give more protection to
information in international mail than information contained within a
laptop.
148. See id. at 1006.
149. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008).
150. See id.
151. See Seljan, 547 F.3d at 1006.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Some level of individualized suspicion should be required before
customs officials can search the electronic contents of a laptop. The pur-
pose of the border exception to the Fourth Amendment does not support
the suspicionless searches of electronic storage devices. Although the
justifications for the exception have evolved, it should not be extended
to a search that has little to do with physically crossing the border and
that is, by its nature, less dangerous than physical objects. The govern-
ment's interest in the search of information on a laptop at the border is
attenuated because there is no greater need to search information on a
laptop at the border than anywhere else in the country, and because elec-
tronic files can be e-mailed across the border. The individual's interest
in the free flow of information weighs against the government's already
lower interest in searching. Courts have exhibited caution in dealing
with the suspicionless reading of personal information in both First
Amendment cases as well as cases involving international mail, which
exemplifies courts' acknowledgement of this interest. Furthermore, the
Ninth Circuit's reliance on the plain view doctrine in Seljan undermines
its holding in Arnold. The rationale for the border search exception does
not justify the suspicionless search of laptops and other electronic stor-
age devices, which is one of the reasons why travelers, who are accus-
tomed to their lowered privacy interest at the border, are surprised the
officers can search their laptop. A border search that falls outside the
scope of the reasonable justifications for the border exception, is attenu-
ated from the government's interest at the border, and one that involves
property that can only contain personal information and data cannot be
considered routine.
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